Measuring Effective Difficulty in Security Countermeasures
- Post by: David Wallace
- July 12, 2021
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Abstract – Many critical infrastructure sites have experienced a significant gap in evaluating physical security measures to counter adversarial threats. Previous models for countering malevolent threats have been dependent on historical frequency, identification of the malevolent actor, and other criteria that have convoluted the results due to the lack of an adequate database. This study aims to refine the security threat assessment premise and the application of appropriate security technology for worst reasonable case scenarios. Specifically, it reviews the previous methods of evaluation for critical security and explores what has not worked well in the use of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) or Risk Analysis & Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) models for identifying malevolent acts. This research presents a mathematical method to evaluate the difficulty of countermeasures for use in cost benefit analysis. Using the cumulative distribution function of the gamma distribution across defensive countermeasures coupled with the probability density function of the geometric distribution of defense layer elements, the ground breaking Foster-Wallace© provides a joint probability of compromise model for optimizing security countermeasure placements with the greatest cost benefit.
(Available for Peer Review, and Subsequent Publication)